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Abstract
Device-independent quantum key distribution aims to provide key distribution schemes
whose security is based on the laws of quantum physics but which does not require any as-
sumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. This strong
form of security, unattainable with standard schemes, is possible only when using correlations
that violate a Bell inequality. We provide a general security proof valid for a large class of device-
independent quantum key distribution protocols in a model in which the raw key elements are
generated by causally independent measurement processes. The validity of this independence
condition may be justifiable in a variety of implementations and is necessarily satisfied in a
physical realization where the raw key is generated by N separate pairs of devices. Our work
shows that device-independent quantum key distribution is possible with key rates comparable
to those of standard schemes.
1 Introduction
A central problem in cryptography is the distribution among distant users of secret keys that can be
used, e.g., for the secure encryption of messages. This task is impossible in classical cryptography
unless assumptions are made on the computational power of the eavesdropper. Quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD), on the other hand, offers security against adversaries with unbounded computing
power [1].
The ultimate level of security provided by QKD was made possible thanks to a change of
paradigm. While in classical cryptography security relies on the hardness of certain mathematical
problems, in QKD it relies on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. A side-effect of this
change of paradigm, however, is that whereas the security of classical cryptography is based on the
mathematical properties of the key itself — how the key was actually generated in practice being,
in principle, irrelevant to the security of the scheme — in QKD, the security crucially depends on
the physical properties of the key generation process, e.g., on the fact that the key was produced
by measuring the polarization of a single-photon along well defined directions. But then, how can
one asses the level of security provided by a real-life implementation of QKD, which will inevitably
differs in inconspicuous ways from the idealized, theoretical description [2]? Errors in the encoding
of the signals of Alice [3], for instance, or features of the detectors not taken into account in the
theoretical analysis [4] can be exploited to break the security of real-life QKD schemes.
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Device-independent QKD (DIQKD) [5] aims at closing the gap between theoretical analyses
and practical realizations of QKD by designing protocols whose security does not require a detailed
characterization of the devices used to generate the secret key (such as, e.g., the dimension of
the Hilbert space of the quantum signals or the type of measurements performed on them) [5, 6,
7, 8]. This stronger form of cryptography is possible if it is based on the observation of a Bell
inequality violation, which guarantees that the data produced by the quantum devices possess
some amount of secrecy, independently of how exactly these data were generated [9, 10]. In some
sense, DIQKD combines the advantages of classical and quantum cryptography: security against
unbounded adversaries based on the law of quantum physics but which does not rely on the physical
details of the generation process. A fully device-independent demonstration of QKD, however, still
represents at present an experimental challenge [11].
In this work, we provide a general formalism for proving the security of DIQKD protocols.
The key element in our analysis is a bound on the min-entropy of the raw key as a function of
the observed Bell inequality violation. Compared to the security proof given in [5, 8, 12], which
is restricted to protocols based on the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [13], our
approach is completely general and can be applied to protocols based on arbitrary Bell inequalities.
Furthermore, it is not limited to “collective attacks”, but is valid against the most general attacks
available to an eavesdropper.
The DIQKD model that we consider, however, is partly restricted as it supposes that the
measurement processes generating the different bits of the raw key are causally independent of each
other (though they could be arbitrarily correlated). This independence condition is necessarily
satisfied in a physical realization where the N bits of the raw key are generated by N separate
pairs of devices used in parallel. Our analysis therefore shows that secure fully device-independent
QKD is in principle possible. In a more practical realization in which a single pair of devices is
used sequentially to generate the raw key, our measurement independence condition is satisfied
if the devices have no internal memory, an assumption that may be justifiable in a variety of
implementations. Note that our measurement independence condition and the level of security
provided here is equivalent to the one considered in [14, 15, 16]. The difference with respect to
[14, 15, 16] is that our proof does not rely only on the no-signalling principle but also on the validity
of the quantum formalism. This results in much better key rates, comparable to those of standard
QKD.
2 General structure of a DIQKD protocol
Let us start by presenting the class of protocols that we consider here, which are variations of Ekert’s
QKD protocol [9, 17]. Alice and Bob share a quantum channel that distributes entangled states
and they both have a quantum apparatus to measure their incoming particles. These apparatuses
take an input (the measurement setting) and produce an output (the measurement outcome). We
label the inputs and outputs x and a for Alice, and y and b for Bob, and assume that they take a
finite set of possible values.
The first step of the protocol consists in measuring the pairs of quantum systems distributed
to Alice and Bob. In most of the cases (say N), the inputs are set to fixed values xi = xraw and
yi = yraw and the corresponding outputs a = (a1, . . . aN ) and b = (b1, . . . bN ) constitute the two
versions of the raw key. In the remaining systems, which represent a small random subset of all
measured pairs (of size say Nest ≈
√
N), the inputs x, y are chosen uniformly at random. From
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these Nest pairs, Alice and Bob determine the relative frequencies q(ab|xy) with which the outputs
a and b are obtained when using inputs x and y. These relative frequencies quantify the degree of
non-local correlations between Alice and Bob’s system through the violation of the Bell inequality
associated to the DIQKD protocol. This Bell inequality is defined by a linear function g of the
input-output correlations q(ab|xy):
g =
∑
a,b,x,y
gabxyq(ab|xy) ≤ gloc , (1)
where gabxy are the coefficients defining the Bell inequality and gloc is its local bound. A particular
example of a Bell inequality is the CHSH inequality [13]
gchsh =
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a+b+xyq(ab|xy) ≤ 2 , (2)
where a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
After this initial “measure and estimate” phase, the rest of the protocol is similar to any other
QKD protocol. Alice publishes an Npub-bit message about a, which is used by Bob to correct his
errors b→ b′, such that b′ = a with arbitrarily high probability. Alice and Bob then generate their
final secret key k by applying a 2-universal random function to a and b′, respectively [18].
3 The DIQKD model
In the DIQKD approach, we do not assume that the devices behave according to predetermined
specifications. For instance, the state emitted by the source of particles may be modified by the
eavesdropper, or the implementation of the measuring devices may be imperfect. To analyze the
security of a DIQKD protocol, we must therefore first specify how we model the N pairs of systems
used to generate the raw key.
These N pairs of systems are eventually all measured using the inputs x = xraw and y = yraw,
but since they where initially selected at random and each of them could have been part of the
Nest pairs used to estimate the Bell violation, we must also consider what would have happened for
any other inputs x and y. Let therefore P (ab|xy) denote the prior probability to obtain outcomes
a and b if measurements x = (x1, . . . xN ) and y = (y1, . . . yN ) are made on these N pairs. This
unknown probability distribution characterizes the initial system at the beginning of the protocol.
In the theoretical model that we consider here, we view the N bits of the raw key as arising
from N commuting measurements on a joint quantum system ρAB. That is, we suppose that the
probabilities P (ab|xy) can be written as
P (ab|xy) = tr[ρAB
N∏
i=1
Ai(ai|xi)Bi(bi|yi)] , (3)
where Ai(ai|xi) are operators describing the measurements made by Alice on her ith system if she
select input xi (they thus satisfy Ai(ai|xi) ≥ 0 and
∑
ai
Ai(ai|xi) = 1 ), where, similarly, Bi(bi|yi)
are operators describing the measurements made by Bob, and where these measurement operators
satisfy the commutation relations
[Ai(a|x), Bj(b|y)] = 0 (4)
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and
[Ai(a|x), Aj(a′|x′)] = [Bi(b|y), Bj(b′|y′)] = 0 (5)
for all i, j and a, a′, b, b′, x, x′. Apart from the conditions (4) and (5), the state ρAB and the
operators Ai(ai|xi) and Bi(bi|yi) are arbitrary and unspecified. The only constraint on them is
that they should return measurement probabilities (3) compatible with the statistics of the Nest
randomly selected pairs, characterized by the observed Bell-inequality violation g.
In quantum theory, measurement operators that commute represent compatible measurements
that do not influence each other and which can be performed independently of each other. The
commutation relations (4) between the operators Ai(ai|xi) describing Alice’s measurement devices
and the operators Bi(bi|yi) describing Bob’s measurement devices are thus a necessary part of any
DIQKD model; security cannot be guaranteed without them.
The commutation relations (5) between the operators Ai(ai|xi) within Alice’s location, and the
commutation relations between the operators Bi(bi|yi) within Bob’s location, represent, on the other
hand, additional constraints specific to the DIQKD model considered here. These commutation
relations are satisfied in an implementation in which the N bits of the raw key are generated by N
separate and non-interacting pairs of devices used in parallel.
In the extreme adversarial scenario where the provider of the devices is not trusted (e.g., if the
provider is the eavesdropper itself), this independence condition can be guaranteed by shielding
the N devices in such a way that no communication between them occurs during the measurement
process. One could also consider a setup where the measurements performed by the N devices define
space-like separated events. However, even in a space-like separated configuration, the ability to
shield the devices is required if the provider of the devices is untrusted, as we cannot guarantee
through other means that the devices do not send directly unwanted information to the adversary.
But, then, the ability to shield the devices is already sufficient by itself to guarantee (5).
In a more practical implementation where the raw key is generated by repeatedly performing
measurements in sequence on a single pair of devices, the commutation relation (5) expresses the
condition that the functioning of the devices should not depend on any internal memory storing
the quantum states and measurement results obtained in previous rounds. In the most general
DIQKD model, the quantum devices could possess a quantum memory such that the state of the
system after the ith measurement is passed to the successive round i + 1 (this state could also
contain classical information about the measurement inputs and outputs of step i). If ρiAB de-
notes the state of the system before measurement i, the unormalised state passed to round i + 1
in the event that Alice and Bob use inputs xi and yi and obtain outputs ai and bi would then
be A˜†i (ai|xi)B˜†i (bi|yi)ρiABA˜i(ai|xi)B˜i(bi|yi) where A˜i(a|x) and B˜i(bi|xi) are generalized measure-
ment operators describing Alice’s and Bob’s measurements and satisfying
∑
a A˜i(a|x)A˜†i (a|x) =∑
b B˜i(b|y)B˜†i (b|y) = I. In such a model, the probabilities P (ab|xy) are then given by
P (ab|xy) = tr[
1∏
i=N
A˜†i (ai|xi)B˜†i (bi|yi) ρAB
N∏
i=1
A˜i(ai|xi)B˜i(bi|yi)] , (6)
where ρAB denotes the initial state at the beginning of the protocol, and the order in the products
is relevant. Imposing commutation relations between all operators pertaining to different rounds
corresponds to neglect the causal order in (6) due to memory effects. We then recover a model of
the form (3) by defining Ai(a|x) = A˜i(a|x)A˜†i (a|x) and Bi(b|y) = B˜i(b|y)B˜†i (b|y).
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4 Security Proof
We now establish a bound on the secret key rate that can be achieved against an unrestricted
eavesdropper Eve for a QKD protocol satisfying the description (3), (4), (5). The information
available to Eve can be represented by a quantum system that is correlated with the systems of
Alice and Bob. We denote by ρABE the corresponding (2N + 1)-partite state, with trE ρABE = ρAB.
This state describes the 2N + 1 systems at the beginning of the protocol. After the N systems of
Alice have been measured, the joint state of Alice and Eve is described by the classical-quantum
state
ρAE =
∑
a
P (a|xraw)|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρE|a , (7)
where ρE|a is the reduced state of Eve conditioned on Alice having observed the outcomes a.
The length of the secret key k obtained by processing the raw key a with an error correct-
ing protocol and a 2-universal random function is, up to terms of order
√
N , lower bounded by
Hmin(a|E) − Npub, where Hmin(a|E) is the min-entropy of a conditioned on Eve’s information for
the state (7) and Npub is the length of the message published by Alice in the error-correcting phase.
It is shown in [19] that the length of the public message necessary for correcting Bob’s errors is
Npub = NH(a|b), up to terms of order
√
N . The quantity H(a|b) is the conditional Shannon
entropy [19], defined by
H(a|b) =
∑
a,b
−P (a, b) log2 P (a|b) , (8)
where P (a, b) = 1/N
∑N
i=1
∑
ai,bi
P (ai = a, bi = b) is the average probability with witch the pair of
outcomes a and b are observed. Computing the key rate of the DIQKD protocol, thus essentially
amounts to determine the min-entropy Hmin(a|E). We show in the following how to put a bound
on this quantity as a function of the estimated Bell violation g.
Intuitively, we want to understand how the observed Bell violation limits the predictability
of Alice’s outcomes a. We start by considering the simpler case of one pair of systems (N = 1)
uncorrelated to the adversary and characterized by the joint probabilities
P (ab|xy) = tr[ρA(a|x)B(b|y)] . (9)
If P (a|xraw) < 1 for all a, then the outcome of the measurement xraw cannot be perfectly predicted.
The degree of unpredictability of a can be quantified by the probability to correctly guess a [20].
This guessing probability is equal to
Pguess(a) = max
a
P (a|xraw) , (10)
since the best guess that one can make about a is to output the most probable outcome. If
Pguess(a) = 1 then the outcome of the measurement xraw can be predicted with certainty, while
lower values for Pguess(a) imply less predictability.
Let gexp =
∑
abxy gabxyP (ab|xy) = tr[ρG] denote the expected quantum violation of the Bell
inequality (1) for the pair of systems described by (9), where
G =
∑
a,b,x,y
gabxyA(a|x)B(b|y) , (11)
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is the Bell operator associated to the inequality g and to the measurements A(a|x) and B(b|y).
Independently of the precise form of the state ρ and of the measurement operators A(a|x) and
B(b|y), the value of the Bell expectation gexp imposes a constraint on the guessing probability (10).
In the case of the CHSH inequality, for instance, the following (tight) bound holds (see Appendix A
and Ref. [25])
Pguess(a) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
2− g
2
exp
4
, (12)
for any of the two possible values xraw = 0 or 1 entering in the CHSH definition (2).
More generally, let
Pguess(a) ≤ f(gexp) , (13)
be a bound between the guessing probability and the Bell violation, where f is a concave and
monotically decreasing function. Such a bound can always be obtained using the semidefinite pro-
gramming (SDP) method introduced in [21]. Indeed, the maximal value of the guessing probability
Pguess(a) for a given value of the Bell expectation gexp corresponds to the solution of the following
optimization problem
max
ρ,A,B
tr[ρA(a|xraw)]
subject to tr[ρG] = gexp ,
(14)
where the maximum is taken over all quantum states ρ and measurement operators A(a|x) and
B(b|y). Following reference [21], one can introduce a hierarchy of SDP relaxations of the problem
(14). The solution to any of these SDP relaxations yields an upper-bound to the optimal solution
of (14) and thus a bound of the form (13), as illustrated on Figure 1 for different Bell inequalities.
The resulting function f is then always concave and monotonically decreasing, as follows from the
convex nature of the problem (14) and of its associated SDP relaxations. Note that relaxations
higher in the hierarchy necessitate more computational resources but yield better upper-bounds.
In the asymptotic limit, one has the guarantee that these upper-bounds will converge to the exact
maximum of (14), though usually a few steps in the hierarchy already give the optimal bound (this
is the case for instance for the CHSH inequality).
As the function f is concave, it can be upper-bounded by its linearization around any point g0
f(g) ≤ µ(g0) + ν(g0)g , (15)
where µ(g0) = f(g0)− f ′(g0)g0, ν(g0) = f ′(g0). From concavity, it also follows that
f(g) = min
g0
[µ(g0) + ν(g0)g] . (16)
The bound (13) is thus equivalent to the family of inequalities P (a|xraw) ≤ µ(g0) + ν(g0) gexp for
all a and g0. Since these inequalities are satisfied by any quantum distribution (9), and thus in
particular by any state ρ, they are equivalent to the operator inequalities
A(a|xraw) ≤ µ(g0)1 + ν(g0)G , (17)
valid for all a, g0, and any set of measurements A(a|x) and B(b|y). A proof of the bound (13) for
the CHSH inequality based on such operator inequalities is given in Appendix A. In general, the
validity of any linear operator inequality of the form (17) can be established, independently of the
Hilbert space dimension, using the dual formulation [24] of the SDP techniques introduced in [21].
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Figure 1: Guessing probability Pguess(a) vs Bell violation gexp for the CHSH inequality, the chained
inequality with n = 3 inputs [22], and the Collins-Gisin-Linden-Massar-Popescu (CGLMP) inequal-
ity with d = 3 outputs [23]. Note that the symmetry of these inequalities implies that the bounds
on the guessing probabilities are the same for any inputs xraw entering into their definition. The
horizontal scale represents the relative violation ranging from the local bound gloc to the maximal
quantum bound gq. The CHSH curve is given by the function (12), the chained and CGLMP
inequalities curves have been obtained by solving the problem (14) using the SDP relaxations in-
troduced in [21]. These last two curves upper-bound the optimal values by at most O(10−4). The
solid line represents a linearization of the form (15) of the CHSH function around a point g0.
We now move to the case of N pairs of systems described by (3) and (7) and evaluate the
probability with which Eve can correctly guess the raw key a by measuring her side information
E . Suppose thus that Eve performs some measurement z on her system E and obtains an outcome
e. Let P (a|xraw, ez) denote the probability distribution of a conditioned on Eve’s information.
On average, her probability to correctly guess a is given by
∑
e P (e|z) maxa P (a|xraw, ez), and her
optimal correct-guessing probability (optimized over all measurements z) is [20]:
Pguess(a|E) = max
z
∑
e
P (e|z) max
a
P (a|xraw, ez) . (18)
Denote by ρAB|ez the 2N -partite state prepared when Eve measures z and obtains the outcome e
(with ρAB =
∑
e P (e|z)ρAB|ez), and write A(a|xraw) =
∏N
i=1Ai(ai|xraw), so that
P (a|xraw, ez) = tr
[
ρAB|ezA(a|xraw)
]
. (19)
Consider the following N -partite Bell operator
G(g0) =
N∏
i=1
[µ(g0)1 + ν(g0)Gi] , (20)
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where Gi =
∑
a,b,x,y gabxyAi(ai|xi)Bi(bi|yi). The single-copy operator inequality (17) implies that
for all a and g0
A(a|xraw) ≤ G(g0) . (21)
To show this, write A′i = Ai(ai|xraw) and G′i = µ(g0)1 + ν(g0)Gi. We thus want to establish
that
∏N
i=1G
′
i −
∏N
i=1A
′
i ≥ 0. Inequality (17) implies that for all i, 0 ≤ A′i ≤ G′i. Defining
Zi = G
′
i − A′i ≥ 0, note then that
∏N
i=1G
′
i −
∏N
i=1A
′
i =
∏N
i=1(Zi + A
′
i) −
∏N
i=1A
′
i =
∏N
i=1 Zi +
Z1
∏N
i=2A
′
i+. . .+
∏N−1
i=1 A
′
iZn. Inequality (21) then follows from the fact that each term in this sum
is positive since it is the product of operators that are positive and, according to (5), commuting.
Using inequality (21) in (18), we find
Pguess(a|E) = max
z
∑
e
P (e|z) max
a
tr
[
ρAB|ezA(a|xraw)
]
≤ max
z
∑
e
P (e|z) min
g0
tr
[
ρAB|ezG(g0)
]
,
≤ min
g0
tr [ρABG(g0)] (22)
where to deduce the first inequality we used, in addition to (21), the positivity of ρAB|ez.
Note now that the quantity tr [ρABG(g0)] is a function of the marginal distributions P (ab|xy)
of Alice and Bob only and does not involve directly the system of Eve. It is shown in [15], that
Alice and Bob can estimate (with high probability) this quantity from the Bell violation g observed
on the randomly-chosen Nest pairs. More precisely, Lemma 5 from reference [15] implies that the
inequality
tr [ρABG(g0)] ≤
[
µ(g0) + ν(g0)gest +N
−1/4
est
]N
(23)
holds except with probability exponentially small in Nest. This, (22), and (16) imply that
Pguess(a|E) ≤
[
f(gest) +N
−1/4
est
]N
. (24)
Finally, it is shown in [20] that the (quantum) min-entropy Hmin(a|E) of a state of the form (7)
is given by
Hmin(a|E) = − log2Pguess(a|E) , (25)
which implies the asymptotic secret key rate
R ≥ − log2f(gest)−H(a|b) . (26)
This bound on the secret-key rate constitutes the main result of our work. As mentioned previously,
the second term H(a|b) is standard and quantifies the amount of communication needed for the
error correcting phase. The non-trivial part of our bound corresponds to the first term, which
quantifies the knowledge of Eve and thus the amount of privacy amplification needed to make her
information arbitrarily small.
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5 Key rate of specific protocols
We now illustrate the above formalism on two DIQKD protocols, based respectively on the chained
inequality [22, 17] for n = 2 and n = 3 inputs. This inequality reads
gc =
∑
a,b
n−1∑
x=0
x∑
y=x−1
(−1)a+b+δ(y)q(ab|xy) ≤ 2 , (27)
where a, b ∈ {0, 1} and x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . n−1} are defined modulo n; the δ(y) equals one when y = −1
and zero otherwise. Note that for n = 2, the chained inequality reduces to the CHSH-inequality.
In both protocols, the observed correlations P (ab|xy) are obtained by measuring a two-qubit
maximally entangled state |φ〉 = |00〉+ |11〉 along n possible directions for Alice and n+ 1 for Bob.
The inputs xraw = n − 1 and yraw = n correspond to measurements in the computational basis
{|0〉, |1〉} and are used to generate the raw key. The chained inequality violation is estimated using
the inputs x, y ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and the corresponding measurement directions are set-up to obtain
the maximal violation of the chained inequality given by 2
√
2 and 3
√
3 for the cases n = 2 and n = 3,
respectively. For the sake of illustration, let us assume that the effect of the noise in the protocol
amounts to the distribution of an entangled state v|φ〉〈φ|+(1−v)1 /4 of visibility v. The conditional
Shannon entropy H(a|b) is then equal to h[(1−v)/2], where h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1−x) log2(1−x)
is the binary entropy, and the observed Bell violations are equal to g = 2
√
2v and g = 3
√
3v. For
the CHSH inequality, we then obtain using (12) and (26) the key-rate
R ≥ 1− log2
[
1 +
√
2− 2v2
]
− h [(1− v)/2] . (28)
The value of the visibility such that this bound is equal to zero corresponds to a quantum-bit-error
rate (QBER) of 5%. The key-rate for the chained inequality for n = 3 is plotted in Figure 2, based
on the SDP bound of Figure 1. The critical visibility corresponds to a QBER of 7.5%, comparable
to those obtained for standard QKD. Numerical evidence suggests that the chained inequalities for
a larger number of settings, n > 3, provide worse lower bounds on the key rate.
The fact that our approach can be applied to protocols based on arbitrary Bell inequalities is
particularly interesting from a practical point of view. As shown in Figure 2, using inequalities
other than CHSH may lead to better key rates in the presence of noise. It could also be very useful
to improve the resistance of DIQDK protocols to photon detection inefficiencies [11], since relevant
improvements over CHSH can be obtained in realistic situations [26].
6 Conclusion
We have shown how to compute a bound on the key rate of a large class of DIQKD protocols1.
Our approach is based on a fundamental relation between the amount by which two quantum
systems violate a Bell inequality and the unpredictability of their local measurement outcomes,
as illustrated in Figure 1. A similar relation has been used in the context of device-independent
randomness generation [25].
To derive our security proof, we have used the fact that the behavior of N uses of the quantum
devices is represented by probabilities of the form (3) with measurement operators satisfying the
1It is easy to see that our security proof can also be adapted to cover the less efficient protocols introduced in [7]
and [27], or protocols with pre-processing of the raw key [17].
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Figure 2: Key rate vs visibility for the CHSH inequality and the chained inequality with 3 inputs.
The key rate is given by the formula (26) where the function f is given by (12) for the CHSH
inequality and has been obtained by solving the problem (14) using the SDP relaxations introduced
in [21] for the chained inequality (see Figure 1). Interestingly for the particular type of noise
illustrated here, the chained inequality leads to better key rate than CHSH.
commutation relations (5). These commutation relations can be satisfied in a physical realization
in which N pairs of separated and non-interacting devices are used to generate the N symbols of
the raw key. If necessary, these commutation relations can be enforced by shielding the devices in
such a way that no communication between them occurs during the measurement process. Note
that if the provider of the quantum apparatuses is untrusted, shielding of the devices is anyway
required to guarantee that they do not send unwanted information to the adversary. Admittedly,
a realization requiring N different devices for the generation of N raw-key symbols is impractical.
Our results nevertheless show that secure fully device-independent QDK with key rates comparable
to those of traditional QKD is in principle possible.
In a more realistic implementation, the raw key is generated by repeatedly performing measure-
ments on a single pair of devices. In such a sequential implementation, the description provided by
Eqs. (3) and (5) corresponds to the assumption that the functioning of the measuring devices does
not depend on an internal memory storing the quantum states and measurement results obtained
at previous steps. While it would be desirable to extend our security proof to cover such possible
memory effects, it may be reasonable to expect our no-memory condition to be satisfied in a variety
of practical setups. After all, this no-memory condition is assumed in standard QKD, where the
description of the devices fits in the formalism of Eqs. (3), (4), (5). But while we make here no
assumptions at all on the measurement operators Ai(ai|xi), Bi(bi|yi) (nor on the Hilbert spaces
on which they are defined), in standard QKD one assumes that these measuring operators have a
fixed and known value, which is identical for all i — an idealized assumption difficult to verify in
practice. From this perspective, the DIQKD model considered here clearly represents a relaxation
of standard QKD, and thus can only be more secure.
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Note that the no-memory assumption allows for devices whose behaviour may vary with time (as
implied by the dependence of Ai(ai|xi) on the subindex i), it only excludes, e.g., that the response
of the devices at step j depends on the particular measurement input at step j − k. Such kind of
memory effects could arguably be excluded, for instance if no explicit memory has been introduced
in the devices or if an “initialization” procedure is performed before every measurement based on
an estimation of the apparatus memory characteristics. It may thus be legitimate to assume for
particular implementations that no imperfections, failures, or implementation weaknesses would
introduce detrimental memory effects (even though imperfections could be exploited in other ways
by an eavesdropper). From this perspective, our work contributes to narrow the gap between
theoretical security proofs and practical realizations of QKD.
Note added after completion of this work: results closely related to the ones presented here have
been obtained independently in Ref. [28].
Appendix: Local randomness vs CHSH violation
Let P (ab|xy) with a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1} be a quantum distribution of the form (9) and let g = ∑a,b,x,y
(−1)a+b+xyP (ab|xy) be the corresponding CHSH expectation. We establish here (see also [25]) that
P (a|x) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2
√
2− g
2
4
(29)
for all a, x ∈ {0, 1}, which implies inequality (12). We consider only the case a = 0 and x = 0 (the
argument applies by symmetry to the other cases as well).
Let G =
∑
a,b,x,y(−1)a+b+xyA(a|X)B(b|y). Following the discussion after Eq. (15), inequal-
ity (29) is equivalent for g0 ∈ [2, 2
√
2[ to the series of operator inequalities
A(0|0) ≤ 1
2
+
1√
2− g204
− g0
8
√
2− g204
G , (30)
since f ′(g) = −g/(8√2− g2/4). By increasing the dimension of the Hilbert space, we can always
take the measurement operators A(a|x) and B(b|y) to be projection operators. Define then oper-
ators Ax = A(a = 0|x) − A(a = 1|x) and By = B(b = 0|y) − B(b = 1|y). It is easily verified that
these new operators are hermitian and satisfy A2x = 1 and B
2
y = 1 . In term of these operators we
can rewrite inequality (30) as
1
2
+
1
2
A0 ≤ 1
2
+
1√
2− g204
− g0
8
√
2− g204
G , (31)
where G = A0B0 + A0B1 + A1B0 − A1B1 We now prove this operator inequality. For this, let
α = 1/(
√
8− g20), γ1 =
√
α/4, γ2 = −g0
√
α/8, γ3 = g0/(16
√
α), γ4 = 1/(8
√
α), and γ5 =
11
(1− g20/4)
√
α/4, and define the following four operators
O1 = −2γ1A2 − γ2(B1 −B2) + γ3(A2B1 +A2B2)
O2 = −2γ2 − 2γ3A1 + γ4(B1 +B2)
−γ1(A1B1 +A1B2) + γ5(A2B1 −A2B2)
O3 = −γ4(B1 −B2) + γ1(A1B1 −A1B2)
−γ5(A2B1 +A2B2)
O4 = 2γ4 − 2γ5A1 + γ2(B1 +B2)− γ3(A2B1 −A2B2) ,
Using the fact that A2x = 1 , B
2
y = 1 , and [Ax, By] = 0, the following algebraic idendity is easily
verified ∑
i
O†iOi = −
1
2
A0 ⊗ 1 + 1√
2− g204
− g0
8
√
2− g204
G . (32)
Note now that since the left hand side is a sum of square, it is necessarily positive semidefinite,
i.e.,
∑
iO
†
iOi ≥ 0, which immediately implies (31). Note that we have established inequality (29)
only for g0 ∈ [2, 2
√
2[. The bound for g0 = 2
√
2 follows from the fact that the function f(g)
corresponding to the right-hand side of (29) is concave and monotonically decreasing and hence
f(2
√
2) ≤ lim→0 f(2
√
2− ) = 1/2.
Finally, we show that inequality (29) is optimal, i.e., that there exists quantum states and
operators that saturate the inequality. Consider the two-qubit state cos θ|00〉 + sin θ|11〉, and the
measurement operators A0 = σz ⊗ 1 , A1 = σx ⊗ 1 , B0 = 1 ⊗ cosφσz + sinφσx, and B1 =
1 ⊗ cosφσz − sinφσx, where tanφ = sin 2θ and 2
√
1 + sin2(2θ) = g. It is straightforward to see
that the corresponding quantum probabilities P (ab|xy) saturate the inequality (29) for all values
of g ∈ [2, 2√2].
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